Recent work in software integrity verification provides techniques for measuring integrity at runtime, where a measurement agent observes the memory image of a running process and constructs some meaningful description of the process's current state. Unlike in static and load time measurement architectures, the target of a runtime measurement is running and hence able to change its state. In this setting, an accurate measurement must reflect a coherent state of the target. A coherent measurement must satisfy two properties: atomicity ensures that a measurement corresponds to the state of the target at a particular point in time and quiescence ensures that the target data is in a consistent state, i.e. not a critical section. We address the former property, showing that we can obtain an atomic measurement using a memory copy-on-write strategy, which we have implemented in the Xen hypervisor. We show that this approach achieves significant performance gains in the memory and time impact to the target, when compared with naive strategies for enforcing atomicity.
INTRODUCTION
Recent work in software integrity verification has expanded the scope of measurement collection from static load Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. time images to running process states [4] . Runtime integrity measurement relies on the ability of a measurement agent to observe the memory image of a running process and to construct some meaningful description of the process's current state. Both load time and runtime measurements may be evaluated by a remote appraiser as part of an access control decision. However, because runtime measurements represent fresher assertions about the target's state, one can have more confidence that decisions that include runtime measurements reflect the intent of the system owner than decisions which rely solely on load time measurements. In some systems such as CoPilot [7] , a runtime measurement may consist of a cryptographic hash of critical but (presumably) static regions of the target's memory. Other systems, including the Linux Kernel Integrity Monitor (LKIM) [4] and State Based Control Flow Integrity (SBCFI) [8] , include more complex characterizations of the target's dynamic state. No matter what technique is used it is vital that the measurement is meaningful and correct.
Unlike in load time measurement architectures, the target of a runtime measurement is running and hence able to change its state. In this setting, a proper measurement must reflect a coherent state of the target. This coherency property can be divided into two distinct properties which must be satisfied to obtain a coherent measurement. Atomicity requires the measurement to reflect the state of the target at a particular moment in time. Quiescence asserts that the target data is in a consistent state, i.e. not a critical section. While not part of coherency, related goals of measurement are minimizing runtime overhead and avoiding target realization of measurement.
A complete solution to the coherency problem will
• Ensure measurement reflects the state of the target at a single moment in time (Atomicity)
• Ensure target data is in a consistent state at measurement time (Quiescence)
• Maximize target performance without starving the measurement agent
• Be undetectable from the target/not require target participation
Load-time measurement systems implicitly meet the coherency goal because the target of measurement is not actively modifying its state while the measurement is being performed. For example, the IMA [9] system hashes the filesystem image of key objects (such as system executables) as they are loaded by the operating system kernel. Because the measurement is performed before the image is actually executed, there is no chance that the image is in an inconsistent state.
The focus of this paper is addressing the atomicity property for run-time measurement agents such as LKIM with a memory copy-on-write (CoW) strategy implemented within the Xen hypervisor [1] . Naive approaches can accurately enforce the atomicity property, but exact undesirable performance penalties on the target. Originally, LKIM used the "pause domain" mechanism available in Xen to suspend execution of the target domain during measurement. This has the unfortunate effect of causing a complete denial-of-service on the target during the length of measurement, which may be several seconds. An alternative is to copy the target's entire memory space, but this wastes large amounts of memory and some amount of time to perform the actual copy operation. In Section 3, we describe a copy-on-write strategy that enforces atomicity during measurement. We show in Section 4 that this copy-on-write strategy can significantly boost performance over the naive strategies. Before describing the specifics of copy-on-write to support measurement, we explore the coherency problem in more detail in the next section.
COHERENCY IN DEPTH: ATOMICITY & QUIESCENCE
As we shall see, without ensuring coherency of measurement, both false positive and negative results may ensue. In the former case, a failed measurement may mean unwarranted denial-of-service to the target, unnecessary rebooting, or manual inspection. Perhaps more dangerous is the latter case, where a compromised system may go undetected and continue to run, and exploit other systems that rely on the correctness of measurement. To elucidate the coherency problem, let us consider the effects of coherency on two example integrity measurements.
Simple Example.
A system tracks two bits of information, a and b, and maintains a parity bit p. Integrity is measured by the assertion a xor b = p (i.e., the parity bit must accurately reflect the parity of the first two bits). Suppose an attacker can manipulate any of the three bits during measurement. The two parts of the coherency problem are as follows, illustrating false negative and false positive results, respectively. Atomicity: Suppose the system starts in a bad state: 0, 1, 0. However, measurement might read the first bit, after which the attacker could switch state to 1, 0, 0, and measurement will see 0, 0, 0 and the state is considered valid.
Quiescence: Suppose the system begins updating the state from 0, 0, 0 to 1, 0, 1. Measurement is done between the two updates at 1, 0, 0 and runs to completion before the parity bit is updated. The state is therefore considered invalid.
This simple example demonstrates the necessity of coherent measurement. Failing to enforce either the atomicity or quiescence property may result in incorrect measurement. Further, as the complexity of measurement increases, the challenge of maintaining coherency becomes more difficult, and the potential impact on the target becomes greater. Consider the following, more complex example.
Complex Example.
A system maintains two distinct circular doubly-linked lists: in_use_list and free_list. Integrity is measured by the assertion that all elements of in_use_list have a particular flag set and elements of free_list do not. Further, there is an implicit assertion that in_use_list and free_list form distinct valid circular doubly-linked lists. The measurement agent must walk both lists and record or validate the proposition.
Atomicity: Suppose the system starts in a bad state, where an element of in_use_list does not have the correct flag set. Measurement may finish correctly on free_list, yet before in_use_list is measured, the bit is flipped, causing measurement to be considered valid.
Quiescence: Suppose the system starts in a valid state, where both lists are valid and have the proper bits set. Suppose the measurement occurs after the target begins updating the lists, moving an element from free_list to in_use_list. Depending on when measurement takes place, one of the lists may not even be a valid circular doubly-linked list, if the pointers are in the process of changing. This may cause measurement to fail, even though the system is valid in both the prior state and the new state after the update.
This example further emphasizes the importance of coherency of measurement. Measurement must avoid the danger of an attacker changing things during measurement to escape detection. The quiescence failure in this example illustrates the fragility of runtime measurement; measurement must be done carefully to avoid measuring a target when the target is in a critical section.
Observe that a failure of atomicity is more relevant for false negatives than false positives. A false positive would mean that the system is valid at the beginning of measurement, and becomes bad during measurement. From the perspective of the point in time of measurement, reporting a bad measurement in this case is a false positive, since the state was valid at the point of the measurement. However, reporting this bad measurement at this point can hardly be considered a bad thing; in any case, an atomic measurement would not capture this invalid state, since it occurs after the point in time of measurement.
In the following section, we describe our technique for satisfying the atomicity property with memory copy-on-write. In Section 4, we show how this strategy can significantly improve target performance during measurement, compared with some naive strategies. Currently, our solution to the quiescence problem consists of a few simple heuristics, such as measuring when the system is idle, or when running in user mode (if it is the kernel being measured). A more complete solution is left for future work.
SATISFYING ATOMICITY WITH COPY-ON-WRITE
Simple, yet naive approaches are immediately obvious for enforcing the atomicity property. Pausing the target domain during measurement will not allow the target to update any of its memory, thus making the measurement atomic. However, this has the undesirable effect of denial-of-service to the target domain for the duration of measurement, which may take several seconds. An alternative approach is to copy the entire memory of the target domain and perform measurement on the copies. This clearly has the side-effect of wasting large portions of memory for measurement and additionally imposing a time penalty for how long it takes to copy memory. Although we present a general strategy for atomicity of runtime integrity measurent, our examples and experiments focus on runtime integrity measurement of the Linux kernel using the Linux Kernel Integrity Monitor (LKIM) [4] . Though we are focusing on measuring the kernel, we apply copy-on-write to the memory of the entire domain, not just kernel memory. This provides support for measuring any portion of a domain's memory including all of user space, which is important if a compromised kernel stores data outside kernel space, and allows for other measurement agents that may want to measure more than just the kernel. Table 1 1 shows the time and memory overhead of LKIM measurement for these naive strategies for identical target domains with different memory sizes and different levels of activity: either idle or building the Linux kernel. On idle domains, measurement is faster, since there is less active memory to measure. For more active domains, measurement takes longer, and can be several seconds; pausing the target for this amount of time is clearly undesirable. Further, the memory overhead for performing a full copy of memory is substantial, and can add significant downtime to the target; a full copy of a 1024MB target takes longer to complete than the time measurement takes when pausing the target domain. (Note that the pause time of the Pause TD strategy is less than the LKIM runtime due to some activity before and after the actual memory measurement.)
Memory copy-on-write may be used to achieve atomicity of runtime measurement, while providing significant improvements in time and memory overhead, compared with these naive approaches. Our strategy for memory copy-onwrite to support measurement is as follows. At beginning of measurement, we enable CoW on the target domain. The target domain is then briefly paused for some initialization, after which the target domain may run during measurement. Any memory writes in the target domain with CoW enabled generate copies of the memory page being written to, prior to executing the write. When measurement completes, CoW is disabled, causing the copied memory to be discarded.
During measurement, the measurement agent will observe the actual target domain's memory for any pages that have not been written to, and the copies for any pages that have. The measurement will be atomic, since the snapshot of the target domain's memory is maintained in the form of copies. As we demonstrate in Section 4, this reduces the target domain downtime and resource usage, when compared with the naive approaches, since the target domain is allowed to run during measurement, and only the pages of memory that it changes during that time are copied.
In this section, we describe our implementation of memory copy-on-write in Xen, and how it is used to achieve atomicity of runtime measurement. Our implementation extends the Xen 3.0-unstable version 2 . In Section 4, we show the results of experiments using our CoW implementation that improve both the time and memory overhead compared with the previously described naive approaches.
Background and Terminology
We assume the reader is familiar with the concepts of memory pages and page tables (see e.g., [3] [2, pages 45-57]). For the purposes of this paper, we assume a page is 4KB of contiguous physical memory. Unifying with existing Xen and x86 terminology, we use the term page table to denote a level 1 page table, whose entries are data pages; a page directory is a level 2 page table, whose entries are either level 1 page tables or 4MB pages. In this paper, we shall generally ignore 4MB pages, as Xen provides very limited support for 4MB guest pages, and therefore so does our implementation.
One important aspect of paging is the manner in which writability of a page is determined. A read/write (R/W) flag is maintained in each page table entry (PTE), describing the R/W property of the page mapped by the PTE. This allows the same page to be mapped with a different R/W property in different PTEs. In other words, writability is a property of the mapping of a page, not a property of the page itself.
We further assume that the reader has some familiarity with virtualization. While our implementation of memory copy-on-write for measurement is in the Xen hypervisor [1, 12] , we will only focus on Xen-specific details when necessary, so a rudimentary understanding of Xen will suffice. The reader should understand the concept of paravirtualization, which utilizes a software interface to a virtual machine (VM) that is different from the underlying hardware [11] ; the VM is aware that it is in a virtualized environment, and is in fact altered to suit this environment. In Xen, this interface is presented via hypercalls that a VM makes to the hypervi- In the remainder of this paper, we shall use the following terminology and abbreviations. A domain (also guest) is a virtual machine running in Xen; we may distinguish a domU, meaning a normal guest domain, from the distinguished domain dom0, which has special privileges to do I/O, manage other domains, etc. A measurement agent (MA) (e.g., LKIM) is the domain/entity performing measurement of a target domain (TD) (e.g., Linux). When necessary, we further distinguish the measurement agent process (MAP) from the measurement agent kernel (MAK), since the process cannot interact with the hypervisor directly, but must go through the kernel. Finally, we shall use the term snapshot to refer to the state of the target domain's memory at a given point in time.
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Assumptions
Our implementation of copy-on-write in Xen is built with one necessary assumption and several simplifying assumptions. The only necessary assumption is that none of the target domain's memory be accessible using Direct Memory Access (DMA). This would permit direct writes to memory by the hardware, which would bypass our mechanism for copying pages that are being written to, and thereby break atomicity.
We make several simplifying assumptions in our implementation, which can be expanded in future work. Our implementation and results assume the following.
• Only supporting x86-32 with 2-level paging, no PAE
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• No shadow paging 3 Physical Address Extension (PAE) is an x86 feature allowing physical addresses to be 36 bits instead of 32 bits.
• No ballooning
• Paravirtualized guests
• Only one snapshot allowed per TD
• Single processor or multi-processor with TD and MA pinned to different processors
• No paging memory to disk by the TD Shadow paging and balloon drivers are both additional Xen memory modes. Shadow paging adds a level of indirection to the page table structure, so the page tables the guest uses are translated into shadow page tables that the machine actually uses. This is not necessary for paravirtualized guests, so we do not currently support it. Balloon drivers are used to dynamically add or subtract memory from a domain. This creates added complexity for our purposes, particularly if pages are removed during measurement.
Our current implementation supports the TD and MA each using their own dedicated processor. Supporting a full multi-processor architecture presents additional challenges with race conditions. Furthermore, measurement becomes more complex on multiple processors, since each virtual CPU will have its own CR3 value. We plan on exploring this in future work.
We do not provide any support for memory that has been paged to disk. This is not a problem when measuring the Linux kernel, as the kernel does not page any of its memory to disk. This may be an issue for measuring other kernels (such as the Windows kernel, which does page kernel memory to disk) or measuring user processes which may have memory paged out. This is a general problem for runtime integrity measurement that exists regardless of whether or not CoW is being used, since it involves measuring a portion of virtual memory that is not actually in physical memory at the time of measurement. A solution to this problem is out of the scope of this paper.
We do support writable page tables, which a paravirtualized guest may use to write to its own page tables. As discussed in Section 3.3.3, this creates some added complexity in monitoring page table changes. We also support shared pages (sharing automatically generates copies, see Section 3.3.3), which is important as all of the I/O for a domU occurs on shared memory, since it is not allowed to directly access hardware. Figure 1 shows the sequence of calls and events that occur when using copy-on-write in support of measurement. Note that the MAK is greyed, since it essentially re-wraps system calls from the MAP into hypercalls to the hypervisor. The first call is from the MAP to the MAK which causes a hypercall 4 to Xen to begin a snapshot of TD. This triggers some initialization for CoW, as described in Section 3.3.2. After this initialization phase, both the measurement agent and target domain are allowed to run. Xen is responsible for copying any CoW pages when a CoW-related page fault occurs, for ensuring that any page table changes will enforce CoW on pages they refer to, and for correctly handling any page sharing involving the TD; this interface between Xen and the target domain is described in Section 3.3.3. The interface between Xen and the measurement agent consists of the MA asking Xen to map pages that it wishes to measure, and is described in Section 3.3.4. When measurement completes, the MAP makes a call to the MAK that will make a hypercall 4 to Xen to end copy-on-write and do some necessary clean up, as described in Section 3.3.5.
Copy-on-Write Architecture
Implementation in Xen
Our copy-on-write implementation adds approximately 2000 lines of code to Xen. Before describing our implementation, we first detail some changes to Xen and some general concepts used in the subsequent sections.
Changes to Xen Structures.
Our implementation requires changes to some Xen structures, particularly those doing memory management. To the structure keeping information about each domain, struct domain, we add a flag indicating that a domain is CoWenabled, and a field to keep track of which domain initiated the CoW. We also add a list to struct domain, so the MA domain can keep the copies of any CoW-generated copies (as we shall discuss shortly, the MA domain gets the copy, while the TD keeps the original). The struct page_info contains meta data about each page of memory. To this structure, we add two flags to the type_info field (that maintains information about the types of pages, e.g, page table or data page), one indicating if a page is a CoW page or not, and the other indicating whether or not the page has been copied. We also add a pointer from the original CoW page to where the copy resides; this allows Xen to map the copy to the MA in the event that the original has been written to (see Section 3.3.4). In order to correctly force and handle page faults when the TD writes to a page, we use an available bit in each page table entry to keep track of the previous value of R/W flag, which we will mark read-only for CoW purposes.
Copying Pages.
In the subsequent sections, when we refer to copying a page, this includes the following sequence of events. First, we create a copy of the page of memory; second, in the page_info structure for this page, we set the flag indicating the page was copied; third, in the same page_info, we add a pointer from the original page to the copy. Note that while the copy of memory is exactly the same as the original, the copy's page_info will be different, since the meta data about the page is different.
Who gets the copy?.
One of the significant design decisions of this copy-onwrite model is to determine who gets the copy, the TD or the MA. We give the MA the copy, which is necessary for several reasons. One of our implicit goals is to not disturb the running target domain, which is more likely if giving the copy to the TD and allowing the MA to keep the original. A particular challenge occurs if the TD is using 4MB pages, which must be contiguous physical memory in a paravirtualized guest. First, finding a 4MB contiguous block of memory for a copy may be difficult, if not impossible. Secondly, portions of the 4MB page are allowed to be mapped as 4KB pages. If a page fault occurs on a 4MB page after one of the 4KB pages has already been copied, replacing the copied 4KB page inside the copied 4MB page would be overly burdensome. Giving the copy to the TD alleviates this problem, as it does not require the 4MB block to be mapped as 4MB of contiguous physical memory, but can instead be mapped as several 4KB pages. In addition to this 4MB page problem, whichever domain gets the copy will suffer a performance penalty, since any mappings of the original page will have to change to point to the copy. Were the copy to go to the TD, this would require a full page table walk to determine all locations where the page is mapped. As described in Section 3.3.4, we maintain better control over the mappings to the MA and avoid a full page table walk. This fits with our goal to maximize target performance. Further, by giving the MA the copy, we can avoid any MMU-direct changes and avoid race conditions with the MA walking the page tables of the TD.
Memory Layout. Figure 2 shows the layout of memory when copy-on-write is enabled. The hypervisor controls access to physical memory. The set of working pages owned by the TD consist of those that are read-only, if they have not been written to during CoW, and a set of dirtied pages that have been written to. These are pages mapped into the virtual address space of the TD. On the other side, the MA domain may have some combination of copied pages and read-only pages of the TD mapped into its virtual address space (it will have its own pages mapped as well). This ensures that the pages it is measuring will result in an atomic measurement.
If there is insufficient memory for a copy of a page at any point during CoW, the TD is paused until unsnapshot is called. This allows an atomic measurement to run to completion, assuming that performing measurement is more important than starving the TD. Alternatively, we could allow the MA to decide whether it wants to complete or 
Snapshot
When the hypercall snapshot(td) is received by Xen, the following operations occur. Copying all of the TD's page tables immediately is necessary since we change them in step 4. This will likely also result in time saving, as the page tables are likely to change anyway. Pages that are owned by the TD and shared with another domain are copied so CoW does not disturb the domain they are shared with, which may write to them (especially for I/O purposes). Similarly, pages owned by another domain that are shared to the TD are also copied up front.
We then mark all of the pages in the target domain as CoW. This is done by marking a flag in the type_info field of the page_info struct corresponding to the page, which we have reserved for CoW purposes. It may be desirable to permit CoW enabling for only the portions of the target domain's memory that involve measurement, though we do not currently support this.
We then mark all of the page table entries (PTE's) in the target domain as read-only (RO), and save the previous state of the R/W flag in an available bit. This ensures that any writes to one of the target domain's pages will trigger a page fault, so we can generate a copy and then revert the R/W flag to its prior state (see Section 3.3.3). In truth, a PTE is only changed to read-only if the page that it refers to has not already been copied.
Finally, we make copies of the target domain's registers, so the MA can read the register values at the time of the snapshot. This is particularly relevant for the CR3 register, which contains a pointer to the page directory. The MA needs this value to determine the locations of the pages it wants to measure.
Interface with Target Domain
The following activities of the target domain require additions to the hypervisor to support CoW.
• Page faults
• Page table changes -Changes to PTE's (if relevant, entry must stay RO)
-A page becomes a page table (if relevant, all entries must be marked RO)
• Share a page
Since we marked all of the PTE's in the TD as read-only, we must handle any of the resulting page faults. If the page fault is a write fault on a CoW page, then we must handle it. Handling the fault entails copying the page as described in Section 3.3.1, if the page was not already copied. After the page has been copied, the R/W flag is reverted to its state prior to CoW initialization. Finally, we must update any current mappings of the original page in the MA to point to the copy instead (see Section 3.3.4).
In order to ensure that writes in the TD trigger page faults, any time a PTE changes or a new page table is created, we must ensure that any entries referring to uncopied CoW pages are read-only (if the page has been copied, the TD is free to write to it). When a PTE changes, we save the R/W bit that it would change to, and mark the entry read-only, so the PTE entry will act just as those that were present when CoW was initialized. In a similar fashion, when a data page is elevated to a page table, before installing the page table, we save the R/W bit of each entry, and mark it read-only. Note that these changes are not relevant for the page directory, since the R/W flag is only enforced on page tables, so there is no need to mark entries in the page directory read-only.
Changes to page tables can occur in a couple of ways, which add to the complexity of our implementation. A fully paravirtualized guest may issue hypercalls asking Xen to change a PTE, since the guest is not allowed write access to its page tables. However, Xen also supports a writable page table mode, where the guest is given write access to its (level 1) page tables. In this case, instead of permitting the guest to truly write to the page table, Xen actually emulates the instruction to update the PTE and verifies the result, giving the guest the illusion of writable page tables. Our implementation supports both writable page tables and hypercalls for updates.
When a page owned by the TD is shared to another domain, we simply copy the page prior to sharing. This is to avoid affecting the sharing domain, since we would have to force read-only page faults for its mapping of the page also. Since a page is being shared, it is likely that it is about to be written to anyway. We do nothing when a page owned by another domain is shared to the TD, since it would not have been part of the TD's memory at the time of the snapshot.
Interface with Measurement Agent
As shown in Figure 1 , during measurement, the interface between the measurement agent and the Xen hypervisor consists of the MA asking Xen to map pages of the TD for measurement. The first thing the MA will do is ask for the value of CR3 at the time of the snapshot. The MA will then request Xen to map the page corresponding to this CR3 value. This map call will ask for the machine frame number (mfn) 5 of the page pointed to by CR3 for the snapshot. Since this page was copied, and the original may have changed, Xen maps in the copy. Once this page is mapped, the MA will have a handle on the page tables of the TD at the time of snapshot. The MA will then continue to ask for TD pages it wants to measure. Each map request entails the following sequence of actions.
• The MA will request to map a page by mfn
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• Xen consults the page_info struct for this page to see if it has been copied
• If so, Xen gets the address of the copied page from page_info, and maps the copy
• If not, Xen maps the original page, and maintains a reverse mapping from physical pages to where they are mapped, in case the original page is later copied
The decision to map the copy or the original is transparent to the MA, which is not concerned with whether the copy or the original was mapped when performing measurement. The reverse mapping is an important step that was alluded to in Section 3.3.3 regarding page faults. In the case where the MA has an original page mapped, the same page will be shared with the TD. In the event that the TD writes to this page, a copy will be generated. In order to obtain a correct measurement, the MA will need to be updated to look at the copy rather than the (about to change) original. To simplify this task, Xen maintains this reverse mapping, so that whenever a page fault occurs in the TD that generates a new copy, Xen can transparently update the MA mappings of this page. Without this mapping, Xen would be forced to do a complete page table walk of the MA to determine where the page was mapped in, which is a very expensive operation.
Unsnapshot
When the hypercall unsnapshot(td) is received by Xen, the hypervisor completes the following sequence of operations. These operations are straightforward. We return all of the flags in the page_info struct to their prior state, and revert all PTE's to their pre-CoW state as well (for uncopied pages, the PTE's for any copied pages were already reverted). All of the copies are then freed and placed on a scrub list to clear the content of the pages. We also clean up the domain changes, such as unmarking the enable CoW flag; these steps are again straightforward.
Testing
Our methodology for ensuring CoW is functioning properly from the target domain's perspective is to compare the memory at the actual time of the snapshot with the CoW copies and current pages at the time the snapshot ends. Hence, for testing purposes, when snapshot(td) is called, we create a full copy of the td's memory. At unsnapshot(td), we do a check of all pages owned by the domain and ensure that any CoW copies are the same as the original and any uncopied current pages are also the same as the original, as they must not have been modified (else we should have copied them). We ran a series of tests including domains while idle, running a memory intensive application, and building the Linux kernel. These tests all showed that our implementation correctly copied pages, apart from the console "magic page" that dom0 updates on keyboard input. This page is not a shared page and is set up by dom0 when the domain is created, and is not specifically tracked by Xen.
RESULTS
We now compare our implementation with the goals of solving the coherency problem described in Section 1, which we repeat here. • Ensure measurement reflects the state of the target at a single moment in time (Atomicity)
Our implementation using CoW accomplishes the first goal of obtaining an atomic measurement. As described in Section 3.3.6, for the tests run, at the end of CoW, any pages modified by the TD were successfully copied before modification, and any uncopied pages were the same as at the beginning of CoW. As discussed in Section 2, the quiescence problem is out of scope of this paper, and will be addressed in future work. We describe the performance results of our implementation in the next section, showing how our CoW strategy for enforcing atomicity compares with naive strategies.
While our strategy does not require the target to participate in measurement, enforcing that measurement is undetectable is more challenging. Our scheme for forcing page faults on writes changes all of the page table entries of the TD. Since a paravirtualized guest has access to its page tables, it would not be difficult for the TD to notice that all of the entries have changed. However, at this point, it would be too late for the target to change things to avoid detection, because copy-on-write will already be active. So, the TD may know that it is being measured, but be unable to affect measurement. Xen's shadow page mode can eliminate this detection, as this implements another level of indirection in the page tables, so the pages used by the machine are different from the pages the domain uses; this is left for future work. It is also possible that the TD may be able to observe other resource usage, particularly if running on a single processor that is shared with the MA. Additional techniques for analyzing a target's ability to detect measurement and how to prevent it is something we will study as future work.
Performance
Our performance results are based on a target domain that runs as a domU and a measurement domain running as dom0. We ran the measurement from dom0 since mapping another domain's memory is a privileged operation that cannot normally be done by a domU. We plan on making further changes to Xen to accommodate a domU that can act as a MA.
We now present some performance results of this implementation by comparing Linux kernel measurements with LKIM [4] using our copy-on-write strategy, measurement that pauses the TD, and no measurement. All benchmarks were run on a Dell Optiplex 745 with an Intel Core2 Duo 2.66GHz processor, with the TD pinned to one processor, and the MA pinned to the other; hence, both the TD and MA are running as single processor domains, but are dedicated to different processors. Pinning the TD and MA to different CPUs allows us to accurately determine the effects of each measurement strategy on the benchmarks without measurement competing for the CPU that the TD is using. The benchmarks we use are compiling the Linux kernel and Webstone 2.5 [6] , a network-based benchmark.
The LKIM configuration used in our experiments performs measurement of the Linux kernel's virtual file system (VFS). As discussed in Section 4.1.3, other portions of the kernel could be measured, which may cause an additional impact on performance. Recall from Section 3.3.2 that we are snapshotting the entire memory of the TD, which is reflected in our results (particularly the memory overhead due to the full copy strategy).
While we give comparisons between CoW and pausing the TD, it is important to note that pausing the TD means the TD is inactive for the length of measurement, while CoW allows the target to run. This alone presents a significant improvement of CoW over the former approach, as the TD will only be paused for short periods of time for CoW initialization and deinitialization (approx. 5-7 milliseconds in both cases), and when handling page faults.
Linux Kernel Build with Measurement
Building the Linux kernel is a good test of memory usage, CPU usage, and disk I/O. Table 2 shows a comparison of compiling the Linux kernel with four different measurement strategies: no measurement, pause the TD during measurement, perform a full copy of the TD's memory, and enable copy-on-write of the TD during measurement.
For these benchmarks, the TD had 256 MB of memory. The strategy for performing measurement was to run LKIM on the TD every five seconds (i.e. measure, then sleep for five seconds before measuring again). The results in Table 2 consist of an average over 10 kernel builds.
The left portion of Table 2 shows the average per-build characteristics: the average kernel build time over the 10 builds, the average difference of each strategy with no measurement, and the average number of measurements completed per build (note that longer runtimes mean more measurements will be done). The right portion of the table shows the per-measurement characteristics: average time of each measurement, and average overhead per measurement, including average initialization and deinitialization time (when the target is paused), and average additional memory usage. Note that pausing the TD has no distinction of initialization/deinitialization, since the TD is paused for the length of measurement; also note that the difference between measurement time and overhead time is due to LKIM performing some initialization before actual measurement and outputting the results after measurement. Initialization of the full copy consists of copying the entire memory of the TD, and deinitialization releases that memory. CoW initialization is as described in Section 3.3.2 (Snapshot), and CoW deinitialization is as described in Section 3.3.5 (Unsnapshot).
In these experiments, pausing the TD caused the most significant slowdown to the kernel build, with more than eleven percent increase in the build time. While the average measurement time was the least in this strategy, the TD was down for more than half a second per measurement. Performing a full copy at each measurement introduces less overhead to the kernel build time than pausing the TD, but requires a large memory overhead to achieve. The initialization time to copy all of the memory takes a significant amount of time all at once, and will increase with the amount of memory given to the TD. Measurement time also takes longer, which is most likely due to the required translation process of the MA asking for pages based on the original addresses, which must be remapped to where the copies reside (as in Section 3.3.4).
Of the three strategies, CoW had the best performance on building the Linux kernel, adding just over one and a half percent to the build time. The additional measurement time compared with pausing the TD is negligible. The average initialization and deinitialization times show that the TD will be paused for about 6ms at a time, much improved over the other strategies. Considering the savings in downtime of the TD, the additional 18 MB of memory overhead is manageable, especially when compared with performing a full copy.
Webstone with Measurement
In order to test the impact of CoW-enabled measurements on network I/O, we ran the Webstone 2.5 benchmark [6] ; this benchmark uses several clients to fetch pages from a web server. In our results, the TD was the server and the clients were running on a remote machine. The TD had 256 MB of memory. Table 3 shows a comparison of this benchmark between the same strategies as before: no measurement, pause the TD during measurement, perform a full copy of the TD's memory, and enable copy-on-write of the TD during measurement.
The strategy for performing measurement was as before, to run LKIM on the TD every five seconds (i.e. measure, then sleep for five seconds before measuring again). The results in Table 3 consist of an average over 5 runs of Webstone.
The benchmark results we show are Server Thruput (higher is better) and Average Response Time (lower is better). This benchmark is less file system intensive, so it does not take LKIM as long to perform measurement. Hence pausing the TD or performing a full copy causes less than a three percent overhead to the results. Interestingly, the amount of time it takes to perform the full copy of memory takes about the same amount of time as when pausing the TD, but uses an additional 256 MB of memory.
Enabling CoW for measurement performs essentially the same as the benchmark with no measurement. For both the Server Thruput and Average Response Time, CoW performs better than both Pausing the TD and Full Copy, with a slight decrease in the amount of measurement time compared with Pausing the TD. The reduced performance for the naive strategies is likely a result of the TD being paused for longer periods of time all at once. CoW permits the TD to run while being measured, which improves the liveness of the server. The amount of memory overhead for CoW is small, since the measurement time is short, and the webserver does not modify much memory when serving these pages.
Discussion
In our benchmark experiments, our copy-on-write implementation for enforcing atomicity caused a significant decrease in the time overhead that measurement imposes on the target. The memory overhead of CoW during measurement is relatively small and substantially less than the full copy strategy. In addition, CoW pauses the TD for much less time than the other approaches, thereby improving the liveness of the TD during measurement.
Our experiments used an LKIM configuration that measured the virtual file system (VFS) of the Linux kernel. Measuring more of the kernel, such as the scheduler, device driver, and networking systems would cause an increase in the length of measurement time and the size of memory being measured. Additionally, the size of the kernel's object graph grows with the activeness of a domain. So, as a domain becomes more active, the data structures maintained by the kernel become larger. Both of these concernsincreasing the size of the kernel's object graph and measuring more of the object graph-will contribute to longer measurement runtimes, and therefore larger overhead due to measurement. We believe that the value of CoW to support atomicity of measurement will be greater as measurement runtime increases.
RELATED WORK
Others have implemented memory copy-on-write in Xen with the goal of decreasing memory usage by supporting CoW sharing of identical pages. Milos et. al. have implemented CoW in Xen for a paravirtual guest using shadow translate mode [5] . They also implement a mechanism for detecting duplicate pages for CoW sharing, which is not one of our concerns. Vrable et. al. use a CoW implementation in Xen for saving memory on a platform with a virtual honeyfarm [10] . The focus of both of these works is to save memory by sharing identical pages, while our focus is on supporting runtime integrity measurement; this distinction induces several differences between their implementations and ours. Our situation is unique since the MA domain that receives the copies is aware that CoW is occurring. In addition, the domain with CoW enabled keeps the original if a copy is made. This is not the case for their implementations; both implementations use a special CoW domain from which pages are shared to guests, and copies are given to domains on write faults.
Their implementations both require using Xen's shadow translation mode, which puts another level of abstraction between the guest's view of memory and the actual machine memory. Our implementation is provided for a completely paravirtualized guest. As noted by Milos, allowing a paravirtualized guest to have access to its actual page tables creates some difficulty with reverse mappings in the event that a CoW page is copied. We describe our technique for solving this problem in Section 3.3.4. However, to expand our technique to unmodified Hardware Virtual Machine (HVM) guests, we would need to expand our implementation to use shadow pages.
Since the concern for these other strategies is to save memory, they are concerned with where they get the memory in the event of a CoW fault, which is problematic if the platform is out of memory. This is a non-issue for our purposes, since we can pause the TD while measurement completes.
The technique of memory copy-on-write is commonly used by operating systems to decrease memory duplication. For example, the Linux kernel implements CoW for inter-process sharing, such as on fork() to share pages between the parent and child [2, pages 388-391]. Our system (and those mentioned above) extends the CoW technique to a virtual machine environment, supporting inter-domain sharing.
CONCLUSIONS
Runtime software integrity verification requires measurement to reflect a coherent state of the target, since the target can change during measurement. Atomicity is important to achieve a coherent measurement that reflects the state of a target at a particular moment in time. We have shown that a copy-on-write strategy can provide significant improvements over naive approaches to achieving atomicity of runtime integrity measurement, incurring only small time and memory overhead. Further, by using copy-on-write during measurement, the target of measurement has greatly improved liveness, when compared with a strategy that pauses the target during measurement. A more thorough solution to the quiescence problem, that the target's data is in a consistent state, is left as future work.
